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Outsourcing of Information Systems as a Strategy for  Organizational 
Alignment and Transformation 
Abstract 
Outsourcing of services is usually viewed as  a way to increase or decrease capacity at the 
margin. By outsourcing a fm can vary its ability to provide goods or services such as 
information technology (TT) processing capacity or applications development, without 
taking on the long term commitment of permanent staff or equipment 
Today, outsourcing provides new options for managers to provide information technology 
infrastructures and services to a fm. In this paper we identify ways in which outsourcing 
may be used tactically to better align business and information technology strategies. 
Specifically, we consider how selective outsourcing enables alignment of incentives, 
business revenues and IT infrastructure cosu;, and how organizational intent can be made 
more consistent with a f m ' s  capabilities. We propose that outsourcing as an information 
systems management strategy can enable better control and lower agency costs as managers 
benefit from better information through external benchmarking. We also consider the role 
of outsourcing as a vehicle to support major organizational transformation, and as a device 
for enabling new models of organization. Based on our analysis we propose a series of 
testable propositions about outsourcing. 
The contributions of this paper include extension of business strategy and information 
technology alignment concepts to incorporate the interdependence between projects, 
product life cycles, and technology transfer. Most importantly, the paper highlights new 
directions for outsourcing research, focusing on the effects of outsourcing on the IT 
organization, the processes of internal technology development and the transfer of 
technologies between organizations. 
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1.0 ln t roduct ibn  
Outsourcing is the subcontracting of a portion or all of the information systems (IS) 
functions and services of one fm to another. While the outsourcing of information 
systems is not a new phenomenon, there has been renewed interest m outsourcing as a way 
to meet pressures to downsize f m s  in a contracting or slow growth economy. Under 
these conditions, managers tend to concentrate on what they view are their f m ' s  core 
activities and jettison peripheral activities for provision by a developed external market. . 
Today, management is increasing the scope of IS functions that are now being obtained 
externally, as exemplified by Eastman Kodak's and Continental Bank's decisions to 
outsource their complete IS functions. In addition, the frequency with which f m s  are 
outsourcing appears also to have increased. Consistent with these trends the market for 
outsourcing IT services is estimated to increase from $29 billion to $49.5 billion in 19943. 
In addition, there is some evidence that f m s  are beginning to reverse prior outsourcing 
decisions and to re-internalize functions that were previously outsourced as well as 
maintaining mixed models of outsourcing and in-house provision of information systems 
functions (Reponen. 1993)~.  It is clear the decision to outsource information technology 
services is complex and is more than just a simple response to economic pressure. 
Empirical studies of outsourcing have primarily been case studies of outsourcing decisions, 
e-g., (Huber, 1993, Lacity and Kirschheim, 1993), or large sample descriptive surveys 
&oh and Venkatraman, 1992a, Loh and Venkatraman, 1992b). While case studies have 
provided useful insights into the process surrounding specific outsourcing decisions they 
have not been used to construct more general theories to adequately explain the outsourcing 
decision or to provide useful prescriptions for managerial action. Similarly, while cross 
sectional surveys highlight specific outsourcing patterns among f m s  they yield few 
guidelines for effective use of outsourcing as a management s tratea.  
Theoretical studies of outsourcing have typically analyzed the phenomena from a discrete 
and narrow perspective such as the design of optimal principal-agent contracts under 
different conditions of information asymmetry and costs (Richmond, et al., 1992). While 
these studies provide prescriptive guidelines for outsourcing management, they do not 
consider the interdependence between a specific outsourcing decision, other information 
technology investment options faced by a fm, and the broader context in which the issue 
is framed. Finally, there is lirile systematic research on how different types of outsourcing 
alternatives affect the internal operations of the IS organization, or how managers use 
outsourcing in supporting other, often more political goals. 
In this paper we review the dominant theoretical models that explain the determinants and 
consequences of outsourcing, and then propose a more dynamic perspective of outsourcing 
as an alignment mechanism integral to a process of organizational transformation. We 
develop a theory of outsourcing based on economic principles and then expand this to 
incorporate notions of resources and capabilities. We enhance this model by accounting for 
different forms of contracting. A series of testable propositions is developed along with 
managerial guidelines on the effective use of outsourcing5. 
3~stimate of the Yankee Group for all Fortune 500 fms  (Loh and Venkauaman, 1992b). 
Numerous examples are given in the tfade press. CHayley, et al., 1993) 
A survey instrument as well as detailed case studies are being implemented to test these propositions. 
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2.0 Models of Outsourcing: A Critical Review 
The trend toward the outsourcing of business functions is increasing in the US economy 
(Brynjolfsson, et al., 1994) and promoted somewhat by the increased shift toward new 
organizational forms, such as value-added partnerships and network organizations 
(Antonelli, 1988, Drucker, 1988, Johnston and Lawrence, 1988). 
Thm perspectives, industrial organization, core competency, and technology transfer have 
been used to explain this trend toward externalization of functions. The dominant 
explanations for this trend are based on transaction cost and agency theory models of 
industrial organization, and focuses on why managers may choose contractual modes of 
governance instead of managing activities within fm boundaries through venical or 
horizontal arrangements. The second set of models considers the role of organizational 
resources and capabilities in explaining the trend to outsource. These include constraints 
imposed by limited management resources and attention, and insufficient organizational 
capabilities to maintain and leverage core competencies. The third set of models considers 
the use of joint venture and other modes of outsourcing for the purpose of technology 
transfer and learning in order to enhance the capabilities of a fm. These different models 
are examined below. 
2.1 Industrial Organization Perspectives on Outsourcing 
Industrial organization studies of the economic structure and behavior of f m s  focus on 
market strategy and internal organization (Tirole, 1988). Within industrial organization, 
transactions cost and agency cost theories are used to explain the structure of f m s .  These 
theories model a fm and its interaction with the environment in terms of exchange 
relations and special emphasis is given to the design, selection and variation in governance 
mechanisms that are used to control exchange relations within the fm or between the fm 
and its environment The principal focus is on designing contracts, incentives and the 
distribution of decision rights in a manner that efficiently allocates resources and safeguards 
against exchange related risks. From this perspective, the decision to outsource 
information systems falls within the general class of "make" or "buy" decisions (Walker 
and Weber, 1984). 
Transactions cost and agency theories provide two complementary models for 
understanding the decision to outsource information services rather than use in-house 
production. The central tenet of transaction cost economics is that profit oriented f m s  will 
organize in a manner that minimizes both production and uansaction costs. Williamson 
(1975, 1985) defines transactions costs as those of searching for a supplier; drafting, 
negotiating and safeguarding a contract; or those costs incurred due to correcting or 
adapting to contract misalignments, setting arbitration mechanisms and effecting secure 
commitments. Williamson identifies three critical factors that determine the magnitude of 
transaction costs: asset specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency. Asset specificity 
refers to the degree to which an asset is specialized to a specific exchange relation, and 
where asset value depends upon the continuation of the exchange relation. The higher the 
amount of such sunk investments devoted to a particular relationship, the higher the 
potential magnitude of "appropriable quasi-rents" or losses from hold-up of the transaction 
by the other party (Klein, et dl., 1978). The greater the uncertainty about the future 
performance of an exchange, or the value of the item to be exchanged, the more difficult it 
is to write specialized contracts covering the exchange. Increasing uncertainty and asset 
specificity therefore increase transaction costs as more complicated contracts and 
governance mechanisms are needed to manage the exchange. If a specific transaction is 
repeated frequently, transaction costs can be reduced through the specialization and reuse of 
the governance mechanism, i-e., the contract. As transaction costs increase, f m s  will tend 
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to internalize production through their hierarchy instead of undertaking exchanges with the 
market unless the market enjoys significant production economies. These relationships are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
Malone et al., (1987), propose that a shift away from hierarchies to market modes of 
obtaining production (an increase in outsourcing of production) will occur as a 
consequence of improving economies of scale in production and improved information 
processing. They suggest that cheaper and more efficient information processing reduces 
the transactions costs of writing contracts, and monitoring and ensuring secure 
commitments making external provision of production more attractive. The resulting 
increase in demand combined with economies of scale in production, enables external 
producers to aggregate production and achieve lower per unit production costs than can be 
obtained in-house, permitting product costs to be lowered further. 
IS products and services lend themselves especially to econornies of scale in production as 
the marginal cost for processing additional volume is low. This combined with decreasing 
transaction costs associated with monitoring and writing of contracts make outsourcing of 
IS most attractive in that large suppliers should have a cost advantage over smaller, in- 
house production. For example, this is illustrated in the credit card processing industry 
where third party processors accounted for 5 1% of all bank card processing as the 
minirnum eficient scale for processing required 10 million accounts (Steiner and Texeira, 
1990). 
A variation of the traditional transactions cost model for outsourcing is suggested by 
agency theory and the more recent work in incomplete conmcting (Grossman and Hart, 
1986, Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). Milgrom and Roberts (1990) propose that bargaining 
and influence costs are more important than asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of 
transaction in determining the selection of governance systems for exchange relations.They 
note that unconstrained short term bargaining to resolve price haggling and disputes is 
inefficient In this case, f m s  will tend to centralize authority and insource services, 
utilizing the hierarchy to resolve disputes and reduce bargaining costs. Two sources of 
bargaining costs are involved, First, coordination failure occurs in competitive markets 
where there is interdependence between actors in implementation of an exchange. Second, 
when there are problems in measuring the value of a good to be exchanged, or when 
individual valuations are unknown, significant resources can be spent in acquiring 
information. These can lead to haggling and non-optimal patterns of bargaining and 
exchange behavior. 
However, in a centralized authority system, such as a hierarchy where producers and 
exchange parties are integrated into a single organization, inefficiencies are introduced by 
the central authority or management Here, inefficiencies arise when exchange parties 
invest substantial resources to lobby and inf2uence management, or when management 
intervenes unnecessarily in transactions. This model provides a second motivation for 
outsourcing as centralized authority is not always efficient at allocating resources, given the 
unequal influence of different individuals within hierarchies. This model suggests that 
managers must trade-off short term bargaining costs in markets with influence costs in 
hierarchies when deciding how to obtain information services. 
The agency perspective considers a fm to be a nexus of contracts among self-interested 
individuals. These contracts exist between the owner of the fm and its employees, all of 
whom seek to maximize their own utility. Agency costs are incurred due to incentive 
misalignments between the agent and the p ~ c i p a l .  Specifically three forms of agency 
costs are incurred, primarily by the principal. Monitoring costs are those incurred in 
measuring the performance of the agent. Bonding costs are 'losses incurred as agents seek 
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to reassure the principal of their good intentions and work. Residual loss refers to losses 
incurred due to incentive misalignments. In addition, within an organization there are 
significant internal coordination costs incurred in processing information and 
communicating between decision makers. Organizations tend to act in a manner that 
minimizes their agency costs. 
A variation of the agency theory considers the relationship between ownership and 
incentive alignment. Grossman and Hart (1986) note that the ownership of assets provides 
the owners with residual claims on profits as well as residual rights of control over the 
dllocation of the asset. Hence ownership is the critical source of authority. They argue that 
in certain cases internalizing production within a fm may be inefficient as it removes 
production incentives from parties to the exchange who are not owners of the means of 
production. These parties have no incentive for efficiency as they have no residual claims 
on profit. In such a case, outsourcing would increase efficiency as the provider of 
outsourcing services has strong incentives to make a profit and control costs. This reduces 
residual losses arising from incentive misalignments and provides a third motivation for 
outsourcing. 
To summarize, the transactions cost and agency approaches identrfy the costs of writing 
and monitoring contracts, the costs of bargaining and influence activities, and residual 
losses from incentive misalignments as key determinants of fm boundaries and the 
selection of information systems governance mechanisms. This incomplete contracting 
approach to information systems governance is partly illustrated by the work of Richmond, 
Seidmann and Whinston (1992). However, a key problem with the application of 
transactions cost and agency theory explanations of information systems outsourcing are 
that they provide static comparative fmeworks  for alternate governance choices and do 
not take into consideration various other factors that may affect the outsourcing decision. 
These include resource constraints on the fm, the requirements for a fm to learn how to 
effectively utilize new technologies, the interdependence between outsourcing and other 
investment decisions faced by the fm, and how production costs vary during the business 
life cycle. We consider these factors later. 
2.2 C o r e  Competence and Focus Perspectives on Outsourcing 
A second explanation for increased information systems outsourcing arises from the 
tendency of fms  to specialize and focus on their core business activities. This is known as 
organizing around strategic core competencies @ahdad and Hamel, 1990). According to 
this notion, in turbulent and competitive environments the success of a fm is determined 
by excellence in maintaining, growing and leveraging a few core competencies and 
translating these into products and services. The scarcity of effective management 
resources leads to the divesting of non-core activities so that attention can be concentrated 
on those few critical factors that determine success. When information systems are not a 
core business activity they are outsourced so that management attention and other scarce 
resources can be focused on those business activities central to the mission of the firm. 
Indeed, Robert C. Ayres, of Eastman Kodak, explained their decision to outsource 
information systems as a desire to concentrate on core competencies: 
"Kodak is capable of being a leader in our core business of imaging 
technology. We are not interested in being a leader in telecom or MIS," he 
commented. "Imaging is a critical function to Kodak, whereas telecom and 
MIS are only strategic functions," he elaborated. To find partners for PIP, 
Kodak underwent a five-phase process -- preparation, selection, negotiation. 
implementation, and ongoing relations -- in each of four areas. Ultimately, the 
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partnershjps formed were DEC for telecommun~cations (the "Telstar" 
alliance), IBM for data centers and the IBM network ("BlueStarW), 
Businessland for PC Support Services ("Microbuddy"), and Zgon for voice 
messaging ("KMX"). (Emigh, 1992) 
While a focus on core competence explains some information systems outsourcing 
(Willcocks and Fitzgerald, 1993) there is little empirical suppon for this notion as an 
effective business strategy. There is scant support for outsourcing of information systems 
enhancing the ability of a fm to successfully manage its core activities. 
2.3 Outsourcing as Technology Transfer 
A third perspective considers outsourcing as a way for a fm to acquire technology and 
know-how. This is especially important in environments characterized by rapid 
technological change where f m s  require new types of specialized expertise on a recurring 
basis. In this view alliances and joint ventures provide a fum with opportunities to learn, 
transfer or acquire critical technologies when the internal rate of technology development 
does not keep up with the requirements of its market (Ciborra, 1992, Kogut and Zander, 
1992) . Hence f m s  will outsource or enter into joint ventures in order to acquire new 
skills, knowledge, or technologies, especially when the internal IS organization fails to 
keep up with the rate of technical change or fails to maintain a technological infrastructure 
similar to those adopted by leaders in the industry. Effective acquisition and adoption of 
innovations is especially important when new technologies give significant performance or 
cost advantages. 
The information systems trade l i t e r a m  points to many examples of outsourcing motivated 
by a need to acquire specialized expertise and technology. However, few critical success 
factors have been identified and there are infrequent assessments of the effectiveness of 
information systems outsourcing as a learning and technology acquisition process. We 
return to this theme later in this paper. Now we subject these notions to critical 
assessment. 
2.4 Cr i t ique  
The transactions costs and agency perspectives have been used to develop normative 
economic models of outsourcing. These perspectives, however, primarily provide a static 
perspective on the determinants of outsourcing. They do not take into account the effects 
of project interdependencies on the choice of a method for governing exchange relations, or 
the social and political settings in which such decisions are made. These perspectives lack a 
process dimension that would explain the dynamics of the situation. 
Second, these perspectives have provided few guidelines for the selection of a governance 
mechanism to guide exchange relations. Neither have they considered the effects of 
outsourcing on the structure and function of the IT organization. 
Third, the effectiveness of the core competency strategy is not yet validated, and the role of 
outsourcing as  a technology transfer strategy has yet to be examined, 
This paper extends the prior research to develop distinct models of outsourcing which 
address some of these limitations. Specifically, we consider outsourcing as a strategy to 
suppon the alignment of incentives, business intent and organizational capabilities of a 
firm. In addition, we consider the role of outsourcing as an enabler of organizational 
transformation. We denote these perspectives as the alignment and trunsformation models 
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of outsourcing and propose that they can be applied to the analysis of other resource 
governance decisions contemplated by a fm. 
3.0 Outsourcing as  an  Alignment Strategy. 
Information technology is an increasingly important factor in shaping firm strategies and in 
enabling new ways of competition (Porter and AUar, 1985). Indeed, IT is becoming a 
strategic necessity (Clemons and Row, 1987, Clemons and Row, 1991). The importance 
of information technology as a strategic resource requires closer linkages between the 
formulation and execution of a f i ' s  business and information technology strategies. 
Henderson and Venkatnrnan (1991) note that achieving this integration requires that the 
information technology and business strategies be reconceptualized into a more 
comprehensive and interrelated planning framework. Consistent with previous strategic 
planning models, they propose that information technology and business strategy be 
"aligned" or "fit" across multiple dimensions and levels, for example, in strategic fit and 
functional integration. 
Strategic fit refers to the alignment of the business and IT strateees with a finn's 
organizational infrastructure and technology infrastructure capabrlities. Strateg~ in this 
sense is defined in terms of a firm's or the IT organization's external market posture as 
represented by the scope, distinctive competencies and governance mechanisms used to 
manage relations with the environment Organizational and IT infrastructure are the internal 
arrangements required to implement a strategy; they include administrative or technology 
infrastructures, processes and skills. Functional integration is the alignrnent of purpose 
and capabilities across the business and IT functional domains (refer to Figure 2) 
(Henderson and Venkauarnan, 1991). 
The alignment models identify key dimensions among which there must be congruence of 
purpose and fit between the external posture of an organization and its internal capabilities. 
Indeed, if there isn't alignment across domains, firms face substantial business and 
technical risk in implementing information technology based strategies. However, the 
model does not identify the mechanisms of alignment for various dimensions, what a 
proper configuration is, or the effects of resource constraints and financial objectives on the 
selection of strategies or infrasnucture configurations. 
In the next section we adapt the alignment model and examine how f m s  can use IT 
outsourcing as an information technology governance mechanism to achieve better "fit" 
between business intent, resources, capabilities and implementation. 
3.1 Outsourcing as a n  Incentive Alignment Mechanism 
Information systems researchers have observed that information asymmetries and incentive 
misalignments between developers, the user organization, and management give rise to 
various agency costs (Gurbaxani and Kemerer, 1989). Information asymmetry and 
incentive misalignment can lead to three forms of opportunism: adverse selection, moral 
hazard and hold-up. 
Estimating time and effort required to develop an information system is difficult Due to 
domain expertise, the internal IS department will tend to have superior knowledge. relative 
to a user, on the effort and time required to accomplish a project. Without competition, the 
internal IS group will tend to over-estimate span time and cost for a project in order to 
assure there are sufficient slack resources to complete it This inflation is called adverse 
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selection between principal and agent When the bidders on a project are more 
representative their bids tend to better represent the actual resources required to accomplish 
it. 
The moral hazard problem occurs when the proper incentives do not exist to use resources 
efficiently. For example, given the difficulty of monitoring an IS development project, 
there is little incentive to accomplish the work in less time and with less resources than 
estimated. Typically, the internal IS deparunents does not share the same high powered 
incentives and risks as does the user or business unit that buys the system, Thus, internal 
IS does not share the costs of delayed systems in the same way as does the user. 
Finally, if users are fragmented, and are dependent upon a fixed information technoloa 
infrastructure, the internal IS group can hold the user up (hold-up) until extra resources are 
allocated to the project This is a form of blackmail. For example, if users share a 
network, a project to enable full connectivity may be delayed until the budget of the IS 
group is increased or more staff added to the project Information asymmetries, incentive 
misalignments and irreversible investment can give rise to opportunism and agency costs. 
We propose that outsourcing (or the threat of it) can be used to attenuate opportunism risks 
and better align the interests of the internal IS organization with those of management and 
users to provide timely, efficient and effective information services. For example, the 
presence of outsourcing alternatives reduces information asymmetry and provides a price 
discovery mechanism for managers. Bids from external service providers is a way to 
estimate the costs of projects and benchmark the efficiency of the internal IS function. 
These benchmarks increase the information available to line managers on the potential costs 
of information services, 
Second, outsourcing contracts can be structured to share risks between the purchaser and 
provider of the system or service. For example, an outsourcing provider may be liable for 
delays in system delivery or lapses in product quality or service. In addition, competition 
among outsourcing concerns provide incentives to reduce costs and to maintain a high 
reputation for performance. These forces serve to make both vendors and the IS 
organization more customer focused and to constrain the problems of opportunism. 
The threat of outsourcing also serves to align incentives by making the internal market for 
information services within a fm more "contestable." Given the high fmed cost of 
information systems and services, and increasing returns to scale, the traditional internal IS 
department is typically a monopoly provider of services to the fm. Baumol, Panzar and 
Willig (1982), however, show that a credible threat of entry has an effect on the behavior 
of an incumbent monopolist by causing it to reduce its price of services to a more 
competitive level. Sirrdarly, we expect that the credible threat of entry posed by 
outsourcing into the internal market of a firm will result in making the internal IS groups 
more competitive. For example, the serious consideration of outsourcing by a major 
computer and software manufacrurer led the internal IS department in order to maintain the 
service in-house, to revise and lower cost estimates and to improve performance 
commitments for running a data centefi. 
The existence of outsourcing alternatives outside of a fm is unlikely to automatically 
transform pricing and performance of the internal IS organization. Instead, it is necessary 
for managers within the fm to make the possibility of outsourcing credible. The fmt way 
to do this would be to request outsourcing bids for a development project or the operation 
Interview with the Director of Telecomunications of a New England firm. 
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of a processing facility. The second is to selectively outsource a few activities to illustrate a 
strong commitment to finding good price and quality combinations. This process makes 
the likelihood of complete outsourcing more credible. We believe that selective outsoming 
of some internal IS functions will transfer and provide sufficient incentives that 
performance wil improve in other IS functions that have not been outsourced. 
As a summary, we propose a set of testable propositons for how outsourcing can be used 
tactically by management to remove information asymmetries and to bener align incentives 
within a fm for providing information services. 
PI: Managers will selectively use bids from potential outsourcers as a 
price discovery mechanism to estimate the cost and h e  required for 
information systems projects. 
P2: Managers will selectively outsource work in order to benchmark the 
performance of the internal information systems group. The 
performance of the internal IS organization will be compared to the 
performance of outsourced projects. 
When outsourcing is used to remove information asymmetries and to align incentives: 
P3: The internal IS organization will revise price, schedule, production 
quantities and service to match the bids of outsourcers. Outsourcing 
of IS activities is likely when it is infeasible for the internal IS group 
to match the external bids given the existing technologies and 
practices within the fm 
P4: Selective outsourcing of IS services will lead to improvements in 
overall performance of the internally provided IS service. 
Improvements will be realized along timeliness, cost, quality, 
schedule, availability, risk and service dimensions. 
P5: Internal information systems groups will be less risk averse, i.e., 
assume greater risk in responding to bids when there is a credible 
threat of outsourcing? 
Outsourcing, from this perspective, serves to align IT and business strategy. It reduces 
inefficiencies due to monopoly behavior of the internal IS function, especially agency costs 
that result from incentive misalignments and opportunism. However, managers must be 
cognizant of the possibility that the internal group when threatened by outsourcing will bid 
below costs and assume greater risks to undertake the project in-house. 
3.2 Outsourcing: Alignment of IT Strategy with the Business Life Cycle 
A second dimension of alignment considers the linkage between the IT investment strategy 
followed by a firm and its financial strategy. For example, Kambil, Henderson and 
Mohsenzadeh (1993) propose that adopting a "real options" approach to IT investment 
helps to more effectively align the financial objectives and IT investment strategies of a 
firm. But, the role of outsourcing as a mechanism for alignment of frnancial and IS 
objectives is not well specified. 
' ~ n  a preliminary field experiment to test some of the above propositions, Fish (1994) found that when 
outsourcing was framed as an alternative, managers were willing to take more risky solutions. 
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Loh and Venkatrarnan (1992b) note that firms with high business cost suucture and low 
performance are more likely to consider IT outsourcing. Low business performance 
generates pressure for outsourcing in order to reduce cost. They also show that the stock 
market typically reacts favorably to outsourcing as a strategy. This highlights the value of 
outsourcing as a mechanism to align financial and information technology suategies. 
However, this perspective is typically static and does not provide guidelines for managing 
information technology investments during the life-cycle of a business or technology 
strategy. 
W e  maintain that it is important to consider the alignment between an information 
technology sourcing strategy and the firm's revenue and information systems cost 
structures at different stages of a product's life cycle. This is especiaLly important given 
two trends: the compression of product life-cycles and the move toward mass 
customization of products. A compressed product life-cycle demands that a fm recoup its 
investment in specialized information technology d in product development more 
quickly. Mass custornization requires a higher investment in specialized information 
processing resources in order to track individual preferences. In addition, the investment in 
information processing resources comes at, or increases in later stages of the product life 
cycle. These relationships are shown in Figure 3. 
Consider a four stage product life cycle consisting of product introducmbn, a growth stage, 
shake-our, and maturity. Compression of life cycles and increased information technology 
costs of mass customization strategies make it increasingly inefficient for product Line 
managers to rely on internal information systems as these have high fured costs during the 
shake-out and marure stages of a product life cycle. Even if the business is very profitable 
during these stages, an internal IT sourcing strategy can reduce margins s igfi~cantly for 
information technology intensive product or service. This is especially the case in various 
banking and financial services where markets such as corporate trust are declining. but the 
costs of maintaining legacy systems, and their integration into newer systems increases 
information processing costs. This reduces the f m ' s  profits in later stages of the life cycle. 
Outsourcing of infrastructure becomes an attractive option for managers during later stages 
of the life-cycle as the fured costs of basic information processing infrastructure costs can 
be shared across multiple products or services and it enables the service provider to achieve 
economies of scale. Second, from the purchasing finns perspective the price for 
information systems services can be converted to a variable cost if it is specified in terms 
indexed to the number of transactions or sales. This provides managers with more direct 
control over costs and extends the period over which they earn positwe margins for a 
product during its life-cycle. It can also enable managers to lower costs. This is illustrated 
in Figure 4. 
Under the assumption of a four stage product life-cycle with increasing fuced costs (as 
illustrated in Figure 4), we propose the strategies for managing.information technology 
sourcing during a product life cycle for an information processrng intensive product shown 
in table 1. 
During the start up stage outsourchg is the preferred information technology governance 
strategy because it minimizes both capital and management resources which are scarce. As 
a product shifts to the growth stage and information technology needs become known it 
becomes attractive to insource in order to achieve economies of scale. In the shake-out 
stage of a line-of-business or a product it becomes more attractive to oursource to allow for 
a reallocation of capital and management resources. During decline, f m s  still have an 
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opportunity to make a profit a s  a low cost producer. Thus, information processing should 
be outsourced to control costs by shifting to variable processing costs. 
The above analysis leads to the following propositions: 
P6: During the shake-out and declining phase of a product or line-of- 
business managers will tend to outsource related IT in order to 
achieve greater control over margins. 
P7: Managers will tend to outsoum a larger proportion of the IT 
infrastructure during the declining phase of a product life cycle to 
reduce the fixed costs of IT infrastructure. 
To date there has been scant research on information systems budgets during the life-cycle 
of a product. The compression of product life-cycles and the need for product 
customization promise to make the alignment of IT costs with the revenue cycle a critical 
factor in fm performance. 
3.3 Outsourcing: Alignment of Intent and Capability 
In addition to cost containment and life-cycle investing, a third motivation for outsourcing 
IS is the need to align the capabilities and resources of a firm with its strategic intent. Given 
the desire to execute a specific business strategy requiring information systems support, or 
the need for specialized information technology skills to develop and implement systems, 
outsourcing becomes an attractive way to acquire organizational capability quickly. This is 
especially the case in situations where competitive pressures require rapid deployment of a 
system and a firm lacks expertise or capability with the underlying technology. 
Outsourcing is also a way of extending organizational capability when it is required for 
only a short time. This approach enables a fm to reduce the costs of fixed long term 
commitments, such as pension benefits for full time employees or specialized computer 
equipment 
Finally, f m s  with major strategic initiatives will outsource routine processes to re-allocate 
skills and talent to strategic projects. Outsourcing is a way to support 'legacy" systems 
while shifting resources to projects more closely related to the fm's  strategy. Thus 
outsourcing will be used by f m s  in order to align internal capabilities with their strategic 
intent. 
Hence we propose: 
P8: Outsourcing of information services will be undertaken to increase 
organizational capacity and to better align a f m s  internal capability 
with its strategic intent and external demand. 
P9: Short term outsourcing will focus on acquiring specialized expertix 
P10: Long term outsourcing will be used to reduce a fm's fixed long 
term financial commitments, such as personnel benefits, main frame 
computing equipment and large operational systems 
In this section we have developed three distinct perspectives on outsourcing as an 
alignment mechanism. However, the above strategies were primarily tactical and generally 
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presumed the existence of a product strategy. Below we consider outsourcing as an 
enabler of organizational transformation. 
4.0 Outsourcing as Organizational Transformation 
Transformation of a f m ' s  information systems erg-anization may be required in order to 
re-orient its goals, missions and values. This re-onentation may be needed to alter inbred 
behavior, culture, or in response to technological discontinuities which radically change the 
underlying technologies and architectures that can outmode the s k i h  and abilities of 
internal IS staffs.. In this section we consider the role of outsourcing as an enabler of 
organizational uansformation, and as means for coping with technological discontinuities. 
4.1 Outsourcing as an Enabler of Organizational Transformation 
Rockart and Short (1989) as well as others highIight the importance of re-engineering the 
internal IS organization in a turbulent and interdependent environment to more effectively 
support the mission of a fm We take a broad perspective of outsourcing that views it as 
part of a larger process of organizational transformation As a fm re-engineers its critical 
business processes, the internal information technology organization must correspondingly 
be changed to improve its output and performance along cost, service and quality 
dimensions. 
Organizational tnnsforrnation, however, is a difficult process. Effective change requires 
that the beliefs of members of the IS organization in how information technology services 
should be provided be altered. Schein (1988) proposes three distinct phases to such a re- 
orientation process: unfreezing, cognitive restructuring and re-freezing. In unfreezing, a 
critical event along with data gathered by organizational members is used to challenge the 
established beliefs. Cognitive resuucturing is the process by which members of the 
organization formulate new views of the organization, that is where change actually takes 
place. Refreezing is the process by which a new set of beliefs embodied in incentives and 
practices are adopted. 
Outsourcing provides managers with new options for managing the organizational 
transformation process. First, outsourcing is an unfreezing event that can be used prior to 
re-orienting the goals and missions of the IS organization. The benchmarking that occurs 
with outsourcing makes the internal IS department aware of how they compare to industry 
standards. Second, outsourcing is a means of providing temporary capability while the 
organization changes it mission and direction. That is, it can be used to substitute for 
internal services should those be unavailable during periods of transition. Third, 
outsourcing of training is a way to refreeze new beliefs through the acquisition of new 
skills and by example. Thus, we expect managers to use outsourcing as a mechanism 
during restructuring of the IS organization. This is exemplified by the increased use of 
consultants in change agent roles. Hence, we propose: 
P11: Selective outsourcing will be used by general or IT management as 
part of major IS organization transformation. The outsourcing 
vendor will be used as a benchmark facilitating the unfreezing of the 
organization, and a s  a change agent by serving as a new role model 
and will provide temporary capabilities during the transformation 
process. 
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4.2 Outsourcing as  a Strategy to Cope with Technological Discontinuities . 
The information systems marketplace and practice in organizations is typically characterized 
by many technological discontinuities8. These constitutes a second driver for transforming 
the information systems function and for oursourcing. As Tushman and Anderson (1986) 
point out, technological discontinuities can be competence enhancing or competence 
destroying. Competence enhancing discontinuities enable the organization to substitute a 
new technology for an existing one and achieve orders of magnitude performance increases 
without rendering obsolete the skills that were used with the old technology. In contrast, . 
competence destroying discontinuities require major shifts in the knowledge base required 
to operate the new technology. 
For example, the shift from one level of microprocessor to another (Intel 80286 to 80386) 
can be viewed as competence enhancing. Here, the performance of computer systems are 
substantially enhanced without transforming the skills required for their use. However, the 
shift toward dismbuted processing (client-server) architectures and the new object oriented 
application development methods are competence destroying. These changes require f m s  
to develop both functional knowledge about a new technology as well as specialized 
architectural knowledge to integrate functions and combine them to provide products and 
services. Successful adaptation to competence destroying discontinuities requires major 
organizational transformation and learning, often with drastic change in personnel and 
leadership. 
Adapting the perspective of outsourcing as technology transfer discussed earlier we 
propose that outsourcing can be an effective means to quickly acquire and apply knowledge 
to transform internal know how and skills. Specifically, we propose that outsourcing is a 
viable mechanism for acquiring the specialized functional and architectural knowledge 
required to take advantage of technological discontinuities. Indeed, in contrast to functional 
knowledge, a key source of value in the outsourcing relationship is the architectural 
knowledge that is owned by the vendor fm in organizing and combining different 
technologies into products and services. 
Outsourcing as a technology management and acquisition strategy is more feasible and 
desirable because large outsourcing vendors develop in-depth knowledge about industry 
segments and are able to master new skills and technology more rapidly than an internal IS 
organization. They must do this in order to effectively compete. Specifically, in 
comparison to smaller IS groups within a firm, large outsourcing vendors are able to 
acquire and leverage new technical and architectural knowledge more rapidly through 
specialization, large investments in in-house training in the new technologies, and by 
integrating and learning from many different client consulting experiences. This enables 
the outsourcing vendor to benefit from experience curve effects and specialization of 
functions not easily matched by an internal IS organization that, in addition, may be 
burdened by maintaining legacy systems. The advantage of vendors will be refleced in the 
comparative rates at which vendors and internal IS organizations develop formal routines, 
methods and procedures to implement new technologies in a fm. 
Hence we propose: 
8 Technological change is normally incremental and cumulative. Technological discontinuilies punctuate 
the change process by a major advance in price-performance improvements that cannot be matched by 
existing technologies and their refinement 
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P12: Outsourcing is an efficient way of acquiring expertise and achieving 
architectural knowledge in the event of technological 
discontinuities. 
P13: Large outsourcing vendors will develop and formalize methods or 
procedures for new technology implementation more rapidly than 
within fm IS depaxtments. Large outsourcing vendors can 
accumulate multiple project experiences more quickly to progress 
down the experience curve. 
The availability of outsourcing as an effective option for managing information tethnology 
and coping with innovations suggests significant changes for the IS function. Specifically 
we expect within fm IS groups to be downsized and that their focus will shift from 
production of systems toward requirements analysis, evaluation and purchase of externally 
provided IT solutions to business needs and the provision of assistance to users in the 
adoption of new systems (technical liaison role). This will require the acquisition of new 
skills, new metrics and models for evaluating IS organizations. Hence we propose: 
P14: Increased use of outsourcing will lead to downsizing of the IS 
organization and a shift in IS management focus to requirements 
analysis, vendor evaluations and relations, and user assistance in 
technology adoption 
In the above section we have proposed that outsourcing as a management strategy can 
enable major transformation of a fms internal IT function and infrastructure. In addition, 
we have proposed that outsourcing is an effective means of acquiring new technologies. 
However, the research to date on how IS organizations respond to technological 
discontinuities and the effects of such discontinuities on organizations and systems is 
sparse. This situation suggests an urgent need for systematic research to understand the 
role and effectiveness of outsourcing as a response to technological discontinuities and as 
an enabler of organizational transformation. It also highlights the need to redirect 
information systems research to systematically explore how f m s  absorb new information 
technology capabilities and its effects on the lT organization. 
5.0 Conclusions 
Outsourcing provides new options for the provision and governance of infonnation 
technology resources for a fm. In this paper, we have identified ways in which managers 
may use outsourcing tactically to better align business and infonnation technology 
strategies by making incentives, revenues and cost structures more congruent over a 
business cycle, and by providing specialized expertise and increasing organizational 
capacity on a temporary basis. We have considered the role of outsourcing in supporting 
major organizational transformations needed to cope with technological discontinuities. 
This paper conmbutes to a refinement of the business strategy and information technology 
alignment frameworks; and to a deeper understanding of the interdependence between 
projects, product life cycle effects, and technology transfer. The paper expands the 
potential of outsourcing as both a tactical and strategic management activity and provides a 
series of testable propositions. Most important, we highlight new directions for research 
that focus on: 
the algnment of incentives between information systems managers and business 
managers, and the u s e  of outsourcing for benchmarking and price discovery, 
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the alignment of information technology budgets and sourcing strategies with 
product or market We-cycles, 
the development, and the transfer of technologies between organizations, 
the processes and organizations used by f m s  to absorb new technologies. 
As the extensive use of outsourcing is relatively new, with mixed results (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1993), little is known about effective processes of managing relations, and 
integrating them with strategic objectives and planning activities of a firm. Effective use of 
outsourcing in practice will require careful consideration of vendors, along with the 
structuring of relations and contracts. 
This paper outlined the emerging potential of outsourcing as a management strategy for 
governing the provision of information services to an organization. Based on our analysis, 
we expect these new management options provided by outsourcing will, in the long run, 
result in improved organizational performance through more effective use of technology, 
and better utilization of capital and human resources. We believe the principles developed in 
this paper can also be extended to the outsourcing of other services by f m s .  
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Table 1: Product Life-cycle and Technology Sourcing Strategies 
Bus iness  
Market Life- 
cyc le  
Start-up 
Growth 
Shake-out 
Decline 
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IT 
G o v e r n a n c e  
Outsource if 
possible 
Shift toward 
lnsourcing 
Shift toward 
outsourcing 
Outsource 
Strategy Assessment 
In the start-up phase of a new fum or line of business in a new 
market both capital and management resources are m e .  ID this 
phase outsourcing is a useful mechanism for preserving start-up 
capital while acquiring the necessary technology support and 
infrastrucaue. Outsourcing preserves capital and management focus 
for the key business. lnsourcing may be required to develop internal 
ex- 
Growth of the firm or line of business justifies the capital investment 
in lT with internal support as specialized information systems can be 
used to differentiate products and services. As the business _prows, the 
economies in xale associated with information technology - software 
and hardware make it more economical to insource more systems 
development and maintenance. 
In the shake-out phase of a line of business or product the 
information technology infrastructure supponing the product should 
increasingly be outsourced. This allows for reallocation of internal 
capital equipment and management resources toward emerg ins 
businesses while extending the life cycle for older products. 
In a declining market, firms still have an opportunity to make a 
substantial profit as a low cost producer in the market This requires 
msformation of the cost structure underlying a product or service 
toward a lower variable cost saucture. Outsourcing provides a 
mechanism to shift from a high fvred cost structure toward a variable 
cost structure such that the total costs to the finn decline with 
decreasing market share. 
Costs 
Production 
Cost Curve 
Toward Hierarchies Toward Markets 
Figure 1. Transaction Cost and the choice of Organization9 
As transaction costs are reduced there is a shift toward markets. 
Transaction 
Cost 
Curves 
- 
g~ource: (Brynjolfsson, et al., 1988) 
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Busineas Strateq  
External 
Strategic 
Internal 
Functional Integration 
Figure 2: The Strategic Alignment Model10 
The strategic alignment model identifies dimensions of business and technology strategies 
that must be aligned to derive benefits from information systems. 
O~ource: Henderson and Venkatraman, ( 1 99 1 ) 
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Revenue Curves 
Time 
Figure 3: Aligning IT Investments with Product Life-Cycles 
The costs of implementing and maintaining systems increase over time as modifications are 
made to the original system, and as it is integrated with newer systems. If product life- 
cycles are compressed as we have observed in many markets today, the revenue curve 
shifts to  the left as illustrated in the above diagram. In this case the time at which the 
product is no longer profitable shifts from TI to T2, forcing the fm to exit the market or 
encouraging it to outsource systems to reduce costs. For the purpose of illustration we 
assume that information senices drive the shape of the above cost curve. 
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Revenue Curves 
Time 
Figure 4: Extending Product Revenues and Life through Outsourcing 
In the previous figure we illustrated how compression of product life cycles reduced the 
time frame for the firm to achieve positive revenues from T1 to T2. In the above diagram. 
the fm chooses outsourcing at time T3 to convert is information procession costs toward a 
variable cost regime. This permits the fm to extend the lifetime of positive revenues from 
an information processing based product in a market place, from T2 back toward TI. The 
new cost curve is illustrated by the dark black line. 
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